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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NIC #01957-84/1
27 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED]
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa [REDACTED]

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Community representatives and specialists met on 20 March 1984 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. [REDACTED]

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Attachment
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WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

SUDAN

The DDI Sudanese military analyst briefed the group on the details of the 16 March bombing attack on the Sudanese broadcasting facilities in Omdurman. Although initial accounts of the incident were confused, there is no doubt that the incident was provoked by Libya. There is no clear reason why the attack was mounted. It could have been an isolated incident, but also could mark an escalation by Qadhafi of his longstanding campaign to unseat Nimeiri. He may also have intended the attack to be a symbolic one designed to demonstrate to the southern dissidents Libya's potential for assistance that the rebels could top if they choose. (They already receive some assistance from Libya through Ethiopia.)

Meanwhile, guerrilla incidents in the south are continuing.

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Warning: The rainy season will soon begin and will seriously hamper anti-insurgent operations. Additional Libyan air attacks against Sudan are possible.

Forecast: Although the U.S. and Egypt clearly demonstrated their resolve to assist Nimeiri in the wake of the bombing, Community representatives are highly concerned that the bombing incident will divert Nimeiri--witness his propaganda blast against Libya--from the more serious problem in the south as well as other internal problems that urgently require solutions. They fear that Nimeiri will be lulled into believing that U.S. and Egyptian support will always be forthcoming no matter what crisis occurs and that this support, even if symbolic, will be enough to serve as a deterrent to both his internal and external antagonists.

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ZIMBABWE

The Government of Zimbabwe's military operations that have been conducted against the dissidents in southwestern Zimbabwe over the past 6 to 8 weeks have had only limited success. Dissident activity continues and the military remains frustrated. Nevertheless, the military units conducting the recent operations seem to have been more disciplined than in the past. The food shortages in Matabeleland--the dissident area--appear to have eased somewhat, but it is still not clear whether the shortage was deliberately created by the government as Joshua Nkomo and his supporters charge.

Warning Notes:

1. There is concern that the dissidents have fled across the border to Botswana and will return later to initiate new incidents. Most analysts believe that neither the Mugabe nor Botswana governments want the dissident activity along their common border to get out of hand to the extent that relations are endangered. DIA, however, believes that the situation could become more serious than many analysts now foresee, and that Botswana's President Masire can ill afford not to respond to any Zimbabwean provocations in view of the national elections scheduled to be held in Botswana later this year.

2. Allegations of government-provoked food shortages--if continued--could seriously tarnish Zimbabwe's image abroad, causing problems for the country's Western aid donors who are trying to assist in alleviating the effects of the current drought.

Forecast: Analysts see the next few months as difficult ones for Zimbabwe. The general economic situation is worsening because of the impact of the serious drought. Substantial food imports will be needed, not only to feed Zimbabweans but the thousands of refugees that have crossed the border from Mozambique. The severe drought in South Africa makes imports from there questionable, and South Africa's own needs will tie up South Africa's transport network. The combination of dissident activity and the worsening economic situation could combine to create heavy pressures on Mugabe as he moves toward the ZANU party congress in August.

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MOZAMBIQUE

The recent non-aggression pact that was signed between South Africa and Mozambique is a positive step in relieving tensions in southern Africa. South Africa has made a major stride in achieving its objective of relieving outside pressures and Mozambique may have bought time to improve the foundering economy and combat the festering insurgency that had been sponsored by South Africa. Machel may now hope that he can cope with the RENAMO insurgents without a major new input from the Soviets or Cubans, a development he has long sought to avoid. RENAMO, without direct support from Pretoria, can carry on but will have to focus closely on winning civilian support rather than just conducting anti-government operations.

Forecast: The arrangement is a fragile one and it will take time before we can assess its durability. At the moment, however, it is a positive development for the U.S. in southern Africa and a setback for the Soviets who now will probably lower their profile and probe for new opportunities to build their influence. Machel's prestige is on the line and he needs to succeed. The Mozambican military is unlikely to make serious progress in quelling the RENAMO insurgency over the next six months. Some Africans, such as President Nyerere, believe the agreement will fail and there are some indications that idealogues within the party leadership oppose what Machel has done. Machel will need a substantial influx of foreign aid from the U.S., other Western donors, and South Africa to justify his action.

Both the Botha and Machel governments will make every effort to make the agreement work. Some analysts believe Machel must show results quickly or the opposition will move against him. Others believe that he has much longer (at least over six months) and that he had prepared the groundwork within the ruling party carefully before taking his historic step.

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NIGERIA

Analysts continue to be very negative about Nigeria's future. The military regime is not coming to grips with the already difficult internal situation. The new leaders seem obsessed that a counter coup could come without warning. Consequently, they seem afraid to take decisive actions for fear of sparking a move against them. Even if they take measures to improve the economy, meaningful economic recovery is unlikely to be set in motion.

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ANGOLA

Despite the positive aspects of the disengagement of South African forces from Angola, Cuban, Angolan, and Soviet interests are also temporarily served because all three can now focus more closely on the military effort against UNITA. The success of the disengagement process does not provide any guarantee that the Cubans, Angolans, or Soviets will now be more cooperative on the issue of a Namibian settlement. Indeed, the recent communique issued after Castro's meeting in Havana with Dos Santos stated more forcefully than before the conditions that had to be met before a settlement could take place.

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